The present study explored the effects of two types of interpersonal trust: general trust and specific trust, on cooperative choices in two-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game, and ex- (2) Communication type strongly affected specific trust towards the partner with whom communication had taken place. (3) Uncooperative communication contributed to the cooperation rates indirectly through specific trust towards the communicated partner, whereas cooperative communication explained the cooperation rates directly. It was found that communication opportunity itself did not affect cooperation directly, but it determined which type of trust came into operation. The possibility of specific trust becoming generalized toward general trust was discussed.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the effects of two types of interpersonal trust (general and specific trust) on cooperative choices in a two-person Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), and to examine the role of interpersonal communication in development of the trust.
Everyday we encounter many situations which require us to make interpersonal decisions in the face of uncertainty. In this study, PDG was implemented as a typical example of such an interdependent, high uncertainty situation. In a PDG, the outcome of an interaction is contingent on or determined by another's action:
one cannot determine the outcomes by oneself.
From this point of view, a PDG may be considered as an interdependent and uncertain situation.
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Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kumiko Mori, Department of Educational Psychology, Nagoya University, Furou-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464-01, Japan. cooperation than in the absence of communication, which in turn produced a greater amount than in the uncooperative communication condition. We can see from these remarks that specific trust developed in a pre-experimental discussion would be influenced by its intent, and if cooperative expressions were made in such a discussion, cooperative choices would be induced by both the discussion itself and by the specific trust raised.
Thirdly, the effect of communication itself could depend on the level of one's general trust. Cotterel et al. (1992) demonstrated that subjects with general fear of exploitation showed a greater negative response to uncooperative communication.
It may also be suggested that there is a relationship between general trust and communication, as well as between communication and specific trust, and between cooperative choices and specific trust. I, therefore, will examine interaction effects between two types of trust and communication in a PDG task, while taking into consideration the three points noted above.
Method
Subjects.
The subjects were forty-eight male and thirty-two female undergraduates who attended an introductory psychology course and voluntarily participated in the experiment. They were randomly assigned to twenty groups consisting of four people of the same sex who were unacq.uainted with each other. Experimental design.
The experimental design included two between-subjects factors and one within-subject factor. The between-subjects factors were preexperimental communication opportunity (experimental group vs. control group) and type of the pre-experimental discussion (cooperative vs. neutral vs. uncooperative). Subjects assigned to the experimental group had a chance to engage in pre-experimental discussion with one of the other members (discussion partner), whereas subjects in the control group did not have any opportunity for discussion. Further, subjects in the experimental group were divided into three subcategories according to their discussion types (described later).
The within-subject factor was game partner (communicated partner vs. uncommunicated partner) and this factor is included only in the experimental group, too. In this group, the PDG task partner switched between the discussion partner and the other member (with whom communication had not taken place) at every trial. Although switching partners was also done in the control group, subjects in this group had no communication opportunity with either of two partners, so there was no difference between them in terms of communication experience. The effect of communication upon general/specific interpersonal trust (GIT/SIT), and the effects of communication and GIT/SIT upon number of cooperative choices, were examined. Apparatus. The experimental room was partitioned into four small booths. Each was equipped with a desk, a TV monitor, a computer, a keyboard, and a file, which contained an instruction sheet, some blank paper and a pen. Each computer was connected through an RS-232C cable with the host machine operated by the experimenter. Experiment was controlled with the 10S-232C multi-channel RS232C driver (IO-DATA). Table 1 Payoff Matrix
Task materials. The game construction was as follows: at the beginning of every trial, each subject received 10-points, and made the decision to contribute all the points to the benefit of the pair (i. e., cooperate) or not (i. e., defect). If one of the partners decided to contribute, then the contribution would not be returned but both of the players received additional 8-points as bonus, regardless of their own choice. Points gained in each trial were cumulated over the trials. Table  shows the game structure. Subjects' TV monitors notified them about following five items after each trial: (1) choice in the previous trial, (2) the amount of bonus points received in the previous trial, (3) the current amount of points, (4) the average number of points in the group of four, and (5) the theoretical number of points that one and one's partner would establish if both continued choosing the cooperative choice from the first trial. The notification of the average number of points was expected to maintain the subjects' motivation for the game. Theoretical number of points was reported with intent to motivate subjects to maximize their own gain, not relative gain. Procedure.
Subjects were randomly seated in the four booths. Following a pre-experimental questionnaire, subjects listened to the instruction tape which was a reading of an instruction sheet about the PDG, and they then played five practice trials. The questionnaire contained five items to assess general interpersonal trust (GIT) and other personality related items. The GIT assessment items were selected from the Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (Wrightsman, 1964 (Wrightsman, , 1974 and the Trust Scale . The responses to these items were measured by a seven-point scale. The items for assessing GIT were as follows (* indicates that a negative response demonstrates GIT): (1) game. (4)* He/she/they does/do not always do what he/she/they say he/she/they will do. (5) I expect that our mutual effort to cooperate will increase the point scored in this game. Subject's responses to these items were measured on 7-point scales, and were added to create the SIT scale.
Subjects played thirty actual trials. The game partner was assigned for each trial. Subjects played an equal number of trials with the discussion partner and the uncommunicated stranger (in the experimental group) or two total strangers (in the control group). Each of their displays showed the current partner's seat number so that subjects in the experimental grout could know whether their partner was the discussion partner or not. While the players believed that they were genuinely playing in a group, the response that each player received was in fact controlled by the experimenter's computer. Thus, subjects played with bogus partners. The bogus partner was programmed toperform according to a revised TIT-FOR-TAT strategy: it was programmed to cooperate in the first trial, and then, imitated the real subjects' choice in the previous trial in 80% of cases. This randomness was intended to increase the reality of the experimental situation. Other settings were the same as the practice trials. Their behavior was recorded by the experimenter's computer.
After all trials were finished, subjects were asked to fill out the post experimental questionnaire, aimed at measuring SIT and at checking experimental manipulation, along with any suspicions the subjects may have. The SIT items were the same as those in the pre-trials' questionnaires except that they were asked in the past tense.
Results
The post-experimental questionnaire re-vealed that nine subjects in three groups had been acquainted with one or two of the other members. Therefore 12 subjects in these three groups and two other subjects who had doubts as to the aim of experiment were excluded from further analyses. Thus, the following analyses were conducted based on the remaining 66. Categorization of the subjects' comments.
Subjects in the experimental groups were divided into the following three groups according to the type of the discussion: (1) COOPERA-TIVE; subjects who emphasized the worth of cooperative strategies or undesirability of defective strategies, (2) UNCOOPERATIVE; subjects who stressed cooperative strategies' weak point or defective strategies' usefulness, (3) NEUTRAL; subjects who estimated cooperative strategies both positively and negatively, or did not mention any strategies at all.
The procedure for categorization was as follows: first, sentences written at the discussion were coded one by one into positive, negative, neutral or unrelated statements about cooperative choice in the game. Second, in the cases that partners agreed with each other in the discussion, both were classified into the same category according to their unified opinion. In other cases, the number of positive, negative, and neutral comments were counted individually, and if the frequency of one type was as twice as greater as the other two types, then each of subjects was classified according to their most frequent type of comments. The remaining cases, that is, cases that had no notably frequent type, were categorized into NEUTRAL groups. In 10 test cases, coding and categorization were made independently by an undergraduate psychology major, along with the author. The judgements coincided in nine cases. Thus, it was deemed justified for the author to code the remaining 56 subjects.
Trust scores. Table 2 shows the mean scores for GIT, SIT for communicated person, SIT for uncommunicated person. It can be seen that SIT for discussion partner was higher than that for uncommunicated person in experimental groups (t(45)= 6.10, p < .001). It was also higher than that for in control groups as well (t(57 .0)=2.65, p<.05 by Welch test). Further, as Table 2 indicates, oneway ANOVA shows that the contents of the discussions influenced subjects' SIT for their partners in the experimental groups (F(2,43) = 6.25, p < .01). Tukey's q-test revealed that UNCO-OPERATIVE discussion lowered SIT in comparison with COOPERATIVE or NEUTRAL discussion. These results agree with those obtained by Lindskold, Betz, and Walters (1986) , Lindskold, Han, and Betz (1986) , Tedeschi et al. (1980), and Cotterell et al. (1992) . Number of cooperators in the first trial.
The number of cooperators in the first trial was analyzed separately to be free from the effects of iteration of trials. First, the effect of Table 2 Trust Scores communication opportunity was assessed. This was achieved by comparing the number of cooperators in the experimental group with a communicated pair, the experimental group with an uncommunicated pair, and the control group. The proportions of cooperators in these three groups were .72 (13 to Models with added effects of GIT or interactions with GIT did not indicate a better fit, offering no effects for GIT. That is to say, for experimental groups, the following results were found: (1) the more COOPERATIVE their discussion was, the greater the number of subjects who chose to cooperate (Kendall's T=.39, p<.01);(2) high SIT induced cooperative behavior in NEU-TRAL pairs (Kendall's T=.45, p<.05); but did not affect it in COOPERATIVE or UNCO-OPERATIVE pairs; (3) GIT had no effect on the number of cooperators; (4) these effects of SIT were the same regardless of the partner; and (5) the number of cooperators was greater than that of defectors (x2 = 4.26, df = 1, p < .05). Table 3 is the choice x discussion type x SIT contingency table.
Thirdly, the effects of trust in the control group were examined in the same way. A 2 x 2 x 2 (choice x GIT x SIT) contingency table was analyzed by log-linear analysis. A model including a main effect of choice, a quadratic interaction of choice and GIT was accepted as optimal model (likelihood ratio x2(2) = 1.97, p = .37). Models that included effects of SIT or interactions with SIT did not indicate a better fit, offering no effects for SIT. These results for the control groups indicate that the number of cooperators in the first trial was: (1) greater Table 3 The number of cooperators and defectors in the first trial in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game Table 4 Cooperation rates after the first trial Table 5 Correlations of variables used in path analyses in the high GIT subjects though, this effect was not significant (Kendall's T=.29, p=.10); (2) not affected by SIT at all; and (3) greater than that of defectors (4) jects' comments were UNCOOPERATIVE, and equal to 0 if they were NEUTRAL or COOP-ERATIVE. Figure 1 and Figure 2 summarize the results of path analyses. The diagram obtained from control group subjects (Figure 1 ) indicates that cooperation rates were substantially determined by GIT: SIT partly depended on GIT but gave little effect to the frequency in cooperation. This makes it clear that, when there is no opportunity to communicate with the partner, one makes a decision based his or her own general interpersonal trust.
On the other hand, in the experimental group, no significant paths toward cooperation rates were found about the uncommunicated partner. Figure 2 shows the effects on the rates of cooperation for discussion partner.
Here, in contrast to the control group, cooperation rates were explained by discussion type and SIT rather than GIT. GIT did not affect cooperation rates di-
•\ 332•\-rectly, but had effects through SIT. Added to this, SIT for the uncommunicated partner is considerably explained by SIT for the discussion partner. We can see the following three points from these results. When there is opportunity to communicate with the partner, first, one's choice is contingent upon his or her specific trust for the partner while the discussion type itself also affects the choice directly if it facilitates cooperation. Secondly, specific trust for the discussion partner is dependent on one's trust for people in general, although discussion may lower it when cooperative behavior is negatively discussed. Thirdly, specific trust for an acquainted (communicated) person may be generalized to that for an unknown (uncommunicated) person.
In summary, the analyses above revealed the existence of two different processes of general and specific trust inducing cooperative behavior. When they had no chance to communicate with the game partner, subjects decided to cooperate according to their general interpersonal trust, but not their specific interpersonal trust. On the other hand, when they had a chance to communicate, their choices were influenced by specific trust for the partner, as well as the type of the discussion. That is, their choices were conditional on the type of the previous discussion in the first trial, and affected by specific trust only when the discussion effect was neutral. After the second trial, specific trust and discussion type both contributed to the total cooperation rate, but this effect was found only with the discussion partner. In other words, their first choices subsequent to the discussion were strongly affected by the previous comments, whomever they played with in that trial. However, moderate discussion or repetition of trials made specific trust contribute exclusively to the cooperation with the discussion partner. Similarly, the discussion type affected simply the cooperation for the discussion partner after repeated trials.
Discussion
This study was designed with two main objectives. The first was to test the effects of general and specific interpersonal trust on cooperation in PDG separately, and the other was to analyze the interaction effects of trust and communication. The results clearly indicate that the effectiveness of the type of trust to promote cooperation is contingent upon the opportunity for communication.
When subjects had no chance to communicate with their partner, they made their decision according to their own general interpersonal trust. On the other hand, if they could discuss strategy with the partner, specific interpersonal trust was the dominant factor in their choice of behavior. From these findings, it can be said that general trust leads to cooperation when communication is inhibited, while specific trust functions under situations when communication is possible. These results are in agreement with the hypothesis mentioned above and results obtained by Mori (1994) , which demonstrated a stronger effect of specific interpersonal trust among friends in comparison with that amongst strangers. The opportunity for communication or the relationship between the players does not affect the cooperative choice itself, but determines which type of trust will affect cooperation.
These results suggest that factors influencing our social decision making will depend on the relationships with the target person.
The effects of trial-iteration should also be noted. In the experimental group, even though subjects' first choice was affected by the type of the previous discussion regardless of their game partner, their total cooperation rates to a communicated partner over all trials were explained by specific trust, as well as by type of the discussions. This may mean that the initial strong affect of discussion type is weakened through the repeated trials.
The iteration effect also helps account for the results with an uncommunicated partner in the experimental group. Although specific trust explained the difference in behavior choice in the first trial and total cooperation rates to communicated partners, it had no significant contribution to total cooperation rates to uncommunicated partners. One explanation for this result is that specific interpersonal trust towards uncommunicated partners was formed and/or transformed in the repeated trials, and the trust scores measured pre-experimentally became inappropriate for predicting behavior. Considering that specific trust is formed through interactions with the target person, game repetition itself might work as an interaction opportunity. This was reflected in the correlation between SIT scores measured at pre-and postexperiment. The correlation was weak in the control group (r=.21,p>.10), but significantly higher in the experimental group (r=.48, p<.001).
That is to say, game behavior itself may influence specific trust as a piece of information about the partner when interaction between the subjects is restricted. Aside from this, strategy held by the bogus partner should be considered. The bogus partner's was held constant in a tit-for-tat pattern in the experiment. McClintock and Liebrand (1988) suggested that partners pursuing tit-for-tat may be judged as more fair and honest than those pursuing a competitive strategy, and as more intelligent and powerful than those pursuing cooperative/competitive strategy. From this point of view, the subjects' specific trust for their partner would be increased through the game iteration in this study.
The second objective was to test the hypothesis that communication would induce cooperation by encouraging subjects to trust their partners. Although communication opportunity itself did not develop cooperative behavior, communication with a member increased specific trust for the target person unless the communication was uncooperative, and the level of specific trust affected the frequency of cooperative choices in the first trial. Aside from this, spe- 
